The rise of ISIS has drawn scholarly attention to militant Islamist movements as quasi-state actors, embracing governance as a core area of legitimation. Due to their commitment to conservative, literalist interpretations of Sharīʿa, jihādī movements have gained a reputation for being patriarchal, misogynist, and ultra-masculinist. This article seeks to qualify this perception, arguing that the social and political order established in jihādī proto-states is not based on norms and practices commonly associated with patriarchy. Although ISIS and other militant Islamist rebel rulers may outwardly have some of the trappings of a patriarchal order, especially in gender relations, they are first and foremost intensely religious-ideological communities, where blood ties and kinship play a minimal role. They are surprisingly bureaucratized and highly regulated, leaving little room for the traditional holders of power in patriarchal societies: the elders, traditional religious clerics, clan leaders, and heads of tribes. Instead, those who hold power are overwhelmingly young armed men whose authority rests on warfare skills and the mastery of extremist ideology. In the case of the ISIS "caliphate", the most well-known jihādī proto-state, women also take part in a variety of roles outside the household, including operative and military roles, defying the image of women as passive victims.
Introduction
The so-called Islamic State (ISIS), 1 an al-Qāʿida offshoot group that conquered substantial parts of northern Syria and western Iraq in 2013-14, has attracted scholarly attention to the issue of rebel governance by jihādī groups. 2 In this context, the advent of the self-proclaimed 'caliphate' is a particularly interesting case because it offers a unique window through which to view how an insurgent organization of the jihādī strand seeks to put its ideological vision into practice by implementing 'Islamic rulings' regarding family, kinship, authority, and gender. Several studies also link the prevalence of patriarchal values to the rise of jihadism. Maleeha
Aslam's detailed study of norms among Pakistani Muslim men suggests that the way men are raised and inculcated with patriarchal norms and honour codes predisposes them to terrorist recruitment under conditions of political and socio-economic marginalization. 9 The nature of 'outraged masculinity' and the conditions nurturing its proliferation are not precisely defined.
Overall the existing literature lends credence to the assumption that Islamist violence is somehow associated with patriarchy and a certain set of social norms and political culture found in 'patriarchal' Muslim-majority societies in general and in the MENA region in particular. In this conceptualization of an Islamist militancy-patriarchy nexus, a political culture of male dominance is seen as being an inherent part of radical Islamist movements, with tribalism or 'tribal culture' serving as an archetype of patriarchal society. 10 This notion is explicitly spelled out by Jacobsen and Deckard, who argue that "the level of tribalism" is a good predictor of religiously motivated violence. Their study is based on a new data set measuring "tribalism", supplemented by empirical cases of ISIS in Syria/Iraq, al-Shabāb in Somalia, and the Ṭālibān in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 11 They find that "it is within tribal Their roles, duties, and rights are all prescribed in detail by the jihādī movement's ideologues.
Although women are encouraged to find their main role in the private sphere, as housewives and mothers, the enforcement of gender segregation nevertheless creates a limited public sphere for women in areas of education, health, policing, and so forth. Far from being helpless victims in a patriarchal world, the female jihādīs actively shape the movement. Despite keeping a low profile, they seem to demonstrate a degree of agency, participating in various spheres of activity, as the exigencies of war have induced jihādī groups to allow for an expanded role for women in recruitment, in propaganda activities, and even in the military domain.
In the following, four specific empirical themes (women, youth, children, and tribal leaders)
will be examined with a view to assessing jihādī proto-states' social practices and adherence to patriarchal norms.
ISIS and women
The role of women 'in jihād' and in the struggle for an Islamic society is an important theme in jihādī ideology. 16 The influential Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād web portal contains several dozen treatises on the topic, many of them heavily focusing on women's contributions to the jihādī struggle with titles such as "The Role of Women in Jihād", "Woman in the Battlefield proper precautions are put in place to prevent the 'unlawful mixing of sexes' (inkhilāṭ), female participation in the public sphere is both possible and to some degree encouraged due to the necessity of having female staff in the education system, health services, the police, the commercial sector, and so forth. Women also play a role in the field of ISIS propaganda, media outreach, proselytization, education, and recruitment. In this and many other fields, they were being trained to fill the specific roles ISIS has designated for them. Online ISIS recruitment videos such as "The preparation of the Muslim women for jihād" were just one of many examples of how ISIS portrayed itself as an ideological state in which women would have specialized roles in society for which they needed training and education. As opposed to the Ṭālibān regime in the 1990s, which banned female education (under the justification that proper gender segregation was practically impossible in war-torn Afghanistan), ISIS encouraged education for women but insisted that it be confined to what women needed in order to fulfil their roles in society.
In practice, this covered a wide range of areas. In fact, both male and female teachers were equally mentioned in ISIS announcements regarding its efforts to remake the school system.
One document announced an obligatory one-week Islamic law training course for "all directors and teachers -male and female", without which they would not be allowed to teach. 31 Another document instructed both male and female teachers to undertake "their required repentance" within a specific time and a specified location in order to avoid exposure to "inquiry" or "judicial proceedings." 32 A third document on internet restrictions in Mosul, specifying the need to employ an all-female staff administration for an "Internet hall Muḥammad specifically addressed the youth: "Oh young people and sons of the clans, attach importance to your religion and pay attention to it." She urged them to remember the hereafter, abandon mundane concerns, and join "the caravans and processions of martyrs." 37 The theme raised by Umm Muḥammad in this quote, namely the special role of youth, will be explored later in this article. 40 Jason Burke, "St-Denis female suicide bomber is not the first, and will not be the last", The Guardian, 18 November 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/st-denis-female-suicide-bomber-is-not-thefirst-and-will-not-be-the-last. 41 One of the suspects behind terrorist incidents in France was reported to have stated on jihadist media that "Women, sisters have moved to attack. Where are the brothers? […] She brandished a knife and she hit a policeman… Where are the men?" Cited in "The young women behind France's 'terrorist commando' network", France24.com, 15 September 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160914-france-terrorism-women-jihadparis-gas-cylinder-islamic-state-terrorist-commando. earlier waves of foreign fighter recruitment. 42 By early 2015, a common estimate of the number of ISIS muhājirāt (or immigrants) from Europe was between 500 and 600. In this context, it is interesting to observe the agency of female ISIS recruits. Many of these female volunteers had defied their own parents' wishes and, in a sense, violated their duty to oblige the wishes of their male guardian. In ISIS's ideology, the duty to participate in jihād trumps all other Islamic obligations. Furthermore, when they arrived in ISIS territory, the muhājirāt were given a new male guardian (in Arabic: walī) or 'patriarch.' He was often the local military commander and he remained the guardian as long as the woman in question was unmarried. He would become her guardian again if she was widowed. What is interesting about this procedure is that the kinship patriarch was replaced by a bureaucratic appointment.
The patriarchal role was reduced to an issue of bureaucratic organization, divested from kinship and blood ties, and set apart from patriarchal authority in its literary meaning as "the rule of the father." refused their mothers' or fathers' plea to come home. 50 The rise of social media as a virtual public space expanded female agency in the ISIS state project in the sense that it permitted female ISIS supporters to have "an unedited voice about their involvement in the conflict." 51 In numerous interviews and blog postings, and on social media platforms, female ISIS activists in Syria have offered detailed accounts not only of their material hardship and suffering but also of their joy and jubilation at participating in building this allegedly 'virtuous society.' Taken together, this material suggests that female recruitment to ISIS was based on ideological and religious commitment, while factors such as sexual attraction, adventurism, and grooming were less decisive. 52 While some of these accounts are clearly the product of ISIS propaganda, the massive social media material produced by ISIS's foreign volunteers and their European-based supporters, in addition to testimonies given in interviews and interrogations, provides a relatively solid basis for drawing tentative conclusions about the motivations of female volunteers. In one such assessment -a study of more than a hundred Western females who have joined ISIS -the authors refute the assumption that most women join ISIS to become 'jihādī brides.' 53 Furthermore, among the large amount of ISIS documents retrieved and published by Aymenn al-Tamimi's Archivist project, there is scant evidence of the notion of "an institutionalized 'sex jihad'." 54 Instead, women appear to be recruited for many of the same reasons as men. 55 As for female ISIS recruits from the Middle East, family bonds to male ISIS members appear to have been very important. 56 In addition, much like female recruits to other rebel groups in the Middle East, patriarchal norms in their home communities have probably been a factor; female recruits saw in ISIS's ideological utopia a way of escaping traditional restrictions imposed by their male kin.
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ISIS, the Elderly, and the Youth
If ISIS were a movement dedicated to upholding patriarchal norms about the sanctity of male dominance over women and of the elderly over the youth, one would perhaps expect the organization to show extraordinary respect and reverence to older people, to valorize age seniority, and to be ruled like a gerontocracy. This is not the case. In fact, the very opposite is a characteristic feature. As Olivier Roy and others have pointed out in the context of France, jihadism can be understood as a "révolte générationnelle" among radicalized youth. 58 Elderly men are not only conspicuously absent in ISIS's ranks of recruits; they are also surprisingly rare in the higher echelons of the organization. Age is hailed as a virtue only when it equals seniority in the jihādī struggle. Furthermore, elderly men are mostly invisible in ISIS
propaganda. This contrasts sharply with state-controlled media in the MENA region, where aging state leaders are the omnipresent stars, and where the youth's anger at patronizing state leaders was one of the most important leitmotifs during the Arab popular revolts. 59 When elderly men do appear in ISIS propaganda pieces, they are often being used as a propaganda mascot for recruitment purposes. One such case was an ISIS fighter walking with a stick and portrayed as "the oldest mujahid in Iraq" by an ISIS media outlet. 60 Another example was a 70-year-old Albanian fighter whose picture figured on many pro-ISIS websites. 61 The message in both cases was not that old men deserve special respect and unreserved obedience, however. Instead, the intention was to prod young men to join ISIS, officers. 65 Perhaps to further underscore the non-patriarchal character of the movement, ISIS videos devote much attention to the clients -many of them middle-aged and elderly menseeking help and assistance from ISIS youth manning the various government offices. These men are often interviewed by ISIS media outlets as they heap praise on the alleged justice and welfare provided by the ISIS government. Underneath, the message is unmistakable: the youth are now in charge, and the traditional patriarchy has been turned upside down.
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ISIS and Children
Yet another avenue for exploring ISIS and its assumed patriarchal character is to examine how the movement relates to youngsters and children. In a tribal, patriarchal family, fathers 
ISIS and the tribal shaykhs
A final aspect worth investigating in order to assess the alleged patriarchal character of ISIS is the organization's relationship with tribes and tribal councils. While patriarchy cannot be reduced to tribalism, it remains true that a society in which tribes fill important socioeconomic and political roles is more likely to embrace patriarchal norms than a society in which tribes and clans are absent.
If ISIS were patriarchal, one would perhaps expect the organization to permanently incorporate tribes into its governing structure or at least cherish and valorize tribal institutions.
There is, however, little empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case. True, early analysis tended to expand upon ISIS's successful co-optation of Sunni tribes, suggesting that "the relationship between ISIS and the tribes is no longer a mere marriage of convenience", but based on a strategic decision to cooperate, highlighting the fact that ISIS had set up a 'ministry' for tribal affairs. Relying on measures such as fuel subsidies and cash bribes, ISIS was seen as pursuing a successful "carrot-and-stick" approach that won them tribal support. 
Concluding Remarks
Over recent years, hundreds of young European women have voluntarily travelled to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq -despite, as a British newspaper reported, "almost daily reports of slavery, rape, and enforced domestication." 82 The puzzle of ISIS's attraction to women should encourage us to revisit the common conflation of jihādī movements and patriarchy in the Muslim world. As shown in this article, the ISIS caliphate is first and foremost a radical ideological project rather than a return to a patriarchal order. A number of practices associated with the jihādī movement are undeniably misogynist and repressive, but explaining those with reference to entrenched patriarchal norms reduces jihadism to a culturally specific phenomenon rather than a socio-economic or political one. Returning to the causal links discussed in the introduction, explaining why jihādī groups thrive in "a tribalist environment" -for example, the fact that jihādīs harness specific "tribal-patriarchal concepts" into ideological tenets -this article instead argues that the causality is different. Militant Islamist movements thrive in societies where tribal patriarchal cultures are strong not because they reaffirm patriarchy but precisely because they represent a revolt against the supremacy of such kinship-based structures. In the case of ISIS, its utopian ideological model, as practised and preached in Mosul and Raqqa, is very different from tribal societies in many key areas.
Most convincing, perhaps, is the dominant role of youth at all levels in jihādī movements, in ways which dethrone patriarchal leaders and displace the elders as authority figures. The new social media platforms and the exigencies of war in ISIS-controlled areas have also given women a more prominent place. Would the role of women be further restricted and the role of youth be reversed if ISIS were allowed to consolidate its governance structures over the longterm? Perhaps, but we might never know, because the ongoing recapture of ISIS-held territories will probably not allow us to observe how jihādī rebel rule would look under more peaceful conditions.
